讲座内容：

注：需到思东502纸质登记当面预约，约满为止。讲座开始前收一卡通记次数，讲座结束后归还。预约而未听讲座、讲座迟到者、重复预约者均倒扣一次，未预约而去听讲座不计次数。

 讲座题目：Multi-Decision Maker Systems Modeling in Air Transportation（航空运输领域的多决策系统模型）

 主讲人介绍：Vikrant教授现在Dartmouth College任教。其研究领域包括最优化理论、博弈论以及多智能体复杂系统在交通、医疗行业的应用。Vikrant教授是Management Science，Operations Research等期刊的审稿人，并在Transportation Research Part A，Transportation Science等期刊发表多篇论文。Vikrant教授从麻省理工学院毕业并取得了交通运输和运筹学双硕士学位及系统学博士学位，在此期间，他曾获多个奖项及荣誉：美国交通部资助的研究生科研奖金，麻省理工大学总统奖学金、择优奖学金等；欧美研发研讨会最佳论文奖，其博士论文曾获得Pikarsky最佳博士论文奖。

 讲座内容：美国国家航空系统（NAS）是一个包含航空公司、乘客及系统运营商的涉及多主体，多目标和主体间的相互作用的复杂系统。NAS的拥堵和延误不仅造成运营成本的额外增加和盈利能力的下降，而且致使服务水平下降以及NAS资源的低效利用。Vikrant教授将利用博弈论模型与我们分享并探讨如何制定缓解航空拥堵的管理机制？

 （附英文摘要：The US National Aviation System (NAS) is a complex system with multiple, interacting agents including airlines, passengers, and system operators, each with somewhat different objectives and incentives. These interactions determine the state of the system. NAS congestion and delays result in additional operating costs and reduced profitability for the airlines, a decrease in the level-of-service to passengers, and a decrease in the efficiency of NAS resource utilization. We evaluate the congestion impacts on the NAS stakeholders while explicitly accounting for their interactions and propose congestion mitigation mechanisms that are beneficial to these different stakeholders.

 First, we measure the extent to which the NAS capacity is being inefficiently utilized and show that at the current level of passenger demand, delays are avoidable to a large extent if we control the negative effects of competitive airline scheduling practices. Then, we develop a statistical framework using data fusion and discrete choice modeling for generating disaggregate passenger travel data, and characterize the impacts of airline network structures, schedules and operational decisions on passenger delays. Next, we propose a parametric game-theoretic model consistent with the most popular characterization of frequency competition, and prove that the level of congestion in a system of competing airlines is an increasing function of the number of competing airlines, the ratio of average fare to operating cost per seat and the frequency sensitivity of passenger demand. Finally, we propose a game-theoretic model of frequency competition under slot constraints, and devise and assess new administrative strategies for congestion mitigation. We show that a small reduction in the total number of allocated slots translates into a substantial reduction in delays, and also a considerable improvement in airlines‘ profits.）

 预约人数：70人